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#Macos malware runonly avoid detection five mac os x
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#Macos malware runonly avoid detection five manual
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“ Malware ,” (short for malicious software ) is the broader term for any malicious program that could potentially mess with your computer. These utilities often slow down your computer, so they don’t want to promote them. They say you don’t need an antivirus because they know people hate antivirus software. Apple markets these products as virus-free.

#Macos malware runonly avoid detection five mac os x

Mac OS X software has more high-risk vulnerabilities than all versions of Windows put together. As Bitdefender CEO Bogden Botezatu explained in a 2015 Digital Trends article:

Every operating system is susceptible to viruses. You’ve also probably heard (most likely from a smarmy Mac user) that Macs don’t get viruses. Windows operating systems are running on over 90 percent of all computers currently in use, making them a larger target for cybercriminals and bored internet troublemakers. This is even truer if you’re a Windows user. If you’ve been poking around on internet-connected computers for a while, there’s a very good chance you’ve gotten at least one of the hundreds of millions of malware floating around. Hxxp://ondayoncom:8080/ondayon.Let’s face it: Malware is pernicious, annoying, and quite often dangerous. And for deeper analysis, the second and third stages are visible and available from the VMRay Analyzer Report.Ĭom.apple.4V.plist df550039acad9e637c7c3ec2a629abf8b3f35faca18e58d447f490cf23f114e8

#Macos malware runonly avoid detection five manual

Within 2 minutes of analysis time, analysts can see a majority of the sample’s behavior, compared to hours of manual reverse engineering. Running the sample in VMRay gives analysts an immediate view into the key behaviors, characteristics, and IOCs. This file type won’t have a problem running on a victim’s machine but it is difficult for security teams to analyze because of the inherent obfuscation and limited tooling available. In addition, the second stage uses the system tool “caffeinate” to prevent the machine from going to sleep while the first stage will continuously query the running processes for common AV programs using the ps command: sh -c ps ax | grep -E '360|Keeper|MacMgr|Lemon|Malware|Avast|Avira|CleanMyMac' | grep -v grep | awk ''Īll of these actions are performed using sub-processes so they can be observed in the process graph and process overview.Īs we can see, this sample uses a different kind of evasion, using a rather uncommon file type, a compiled AppleScript, disguised as a PLIST file.

#Macos malware runonly avoid detection five zip file

The third stage is a zip file containing two dynamic libraries (dylibs) and finally a Mach-O binary, again disguised as a PLIST which can be clearly seen in the Files Tab.

Write the mining configuration (pools.txt, config.txt, cpu.txt).

#Macos malware runonly avoid detection five download

Download and extract the third stage mining payload.

The second stage is again executed using “osascript” and has two main tasks: All downloads are performed using curl which is clearly visible in the Behavior Tab. The second stage is another compiled AppleScript stored at ~/Library/11.png. The second one might be a fallback or used by another variant of the family. Interestingly, there are two URLs that were returned. The first request to budaybu100001com:8080 returns the second-stage URL embedded in the string “-=-=-=” as a marker. The Network Tab shows multiple C2 connections. Now we can dig deeper into each of these characteristics. From the Overview Tab, we can see the main behaviors of the sample including network connectivity, file dropping behavior, and system information gathering. Straight away, we see that a number of VMRay Threat Identifier (VTI) rules hit and the sample is classified as malicious. The “com.apple.4V.plist” file is placed in ~/Library/LaunchAgents by the original dropper and disguised as a Property list configuration file (PLIST) while it is in fact a compiled AppleScript. Note, at the time of analysis this sample of OSAMiner had a 2/60 detection rate on VirusTotal. In this Malware Analysis Spotlight, we will showcase the key behaviors identified during the dynamic analysis. We analyzed one of the latest samples “ com.apple.4V.plist” using VMRay Analyzer. In 2020, the SentinelLabs Team discovered that the malware authors were evolving their evasion techniques, adding more complexity by embedding one run-only AppleScript inside another. The authors of macOS.OSAMiner used run-only AppleScripts which made attempts at further analysis more difficult. This week the team at SentinelLabs released an in-depth analysis of macOS.OSAMiner, a Monero mining trojan infecting macOS users since 2015.